SIGCHI Bulletin, October 1994, Vol 26, number 4. pages 78-79.
 
Book Review
 
Things That Make Us Smart
by Donald A Norman
Reviewed by John A Waterworth
 
Donald Norman's new book  "Things That Make Us Smart" develops the themes 
raised earlier in his "The Psychology of Everyday Things" (POET).  POET 
was concerned with the ways in which designed things can help or hinder 
us in completing everyday activities like opening doors, operating drinks 
machines, or using the bathroom. He convincingly showed how many of our 
artifacts are badly designed for their purpose and spelled out what this 
says about the attitudes of their designers. He pointed out that a 
misunderstanding of the way people interact with artifacts, an 
inappropriate machine-centered approach to design, results in a
pathological combination of person and machine leading to frustration, 
inefficiency and danger. This message was brought home with a series of 
entertaining anecdotes that partly explains why the book was so popular.
 
The latest "Things" book starts with this theme and attempts to take 
us deeper into human cognition by considering the design of things that 
support thought directly. Where POET showed that getting work done can 
be hindered or foiled completely by the mental burden of dealing with 
inappropriate design, the new book focuses on mental work itself. This 
seems like the natural ground for Norman to develop his thesis about the 
relationship between artifacts and human thought, but somehow the attempt 
is unsuccessful. This is partly because the stories are just less 
entertaining, but mostly (and this is why the stories are so dull) because 
there are so very few convincing examples of smart-making things. We 
should ask ourselves why this is the case.
 
Norman claims that things make us smart, not in the sense of feeling a 
sharp, stinging pain but that:
 
"Technology has made us smart, smart
in the sense of being better able to think,
to reason, to make judgments"(p 250).
 
This follows from the fact that technology changes how tasks are achieved. 
If technology can change how we accomplish the task of, say, searching 
for water underground, surely it can also change how we achieve cognitive 
tasks like writing this paragraph. And if such cognitive work is 
facilitated by technology (such as being able easily to change parts of 
this paragraph without having to rewrite the rest) then surely the 
quality of thought will improve? Not just more thoughts, better thoughts. 
He is optimistic that, if used appropriately, in a "human-centered" way, 
this trend for improvement will continue as we evolve via the development 
of increasingly helpful information technology.
 
One link in Norman's argument is that if technology is designed to match 
the cognitive characteristics of people they will work more productively, 
will be happier about using the technology, and will have or cause fewer 
accidents. In other words, cognitive ergonomics is a good thing. I don't 
think this is a claim with which many people would disagree. (Strangely, 
it seems that not enough people take it seriously, despite decades of 
work in the area, starting during World War II and blossoming in 
commercial and academic labs in the 80s. It's good that Norman continues 
to preach this faith so persuasively, but one is tempted to wonder why 
ergonomists, human factors psychologists and cognitive scientists have 
still not reversed the tendency for technology to be "machine-centered".) 
No, the problem lies in extending the argument to those devices that 
directly support cognitive activity.
 
What are these cognitive artifacts that improve the quality of human 
thought?  Language, paper and pencil, spatial storage systems such as 
filing cabinets--these certainly seem to make productive thought more 
likely. Do they directly facilitate thought? Perhaps only in the case 
of language. Norman rightly stresses the importance of the mind's 
representational capacity, the ability to form mental models that enable 
us to understand and explain relatively complex behavior and other 
processes. He suggests we invented language, and that the invention of 
this uniquely powerful cognitive artifact sets us apart from animal and 
machine intelligences by providing the tool for thought that allows us 
to continue to 'invent ever more useful cognitive artifacts that in 
turn support even more invention, even better quality thought.
 
There are problems with viewing language as a cognitive artifact much 
like a notebook or a well-organized office.  Norman rightly states:
 
"Human Language is enormously complex by 
mathematical standards:  Many of its properties 
still defy scientific description" (p 118).
 
Yet we invented language?  We, who had no language to use as a 
cognitive tool to help us invent things, invented the most complex 
of our artifacts, language itself?  I guess we must have been pretty 
smart already.
 
Norman demonstrates the representational capacity of the mind, while 
making the valuable point that accuracy of representation is not 
always important, with the example of dreaming. He remarks, in a 
passage that gives a flavor of the book's style:
 
"It has long been noted that in dreams, 
people are free of the constraints of everyday 
life. We can visualize doing things that are 
impossible in the real world. Ah, the freedom 
of dreams, the fantasies released The 
impossible actions of dreams might be 
ways by which people satisfy their fantasies.  
But they might also result from the 
impoverished programming power of the, 
human mind suppose, just suppose, that 
the wonderfully creative fantasies of our 
dreams are artifacts, accidents of the fact 
that our minds can't quite handle the 
computational job of doing accurate 
simulation" (p 150).
 
The idea that dreaming is a kind of simulated virtual reality where 
deviations from realism result from inadequate processing power is 
interesting, but really only an aside. It doesn't add to the main 
argument since it does not really bear on the question of tools for 
thought, but rather of the capacity for creating unreflective 
experiences.
 
What improvements in quality of thought arise from computerization, 
from information technology? If any artifacts demonstrate how things 
can make us smart it should be these, yet Norman has little to say 
about information technology.  What he does say seems rather to 
contradict his thesis. He is concerned that recent technology fosters 
experiential cognition rather than reflective cognition. In other 
words, we passively watch television, or actively navigate around 
our multimedia interactive guide to the Smithsonian Institute, but 
we don't really think about what we are experiencing. As Norman 
puts it,
 
"One can have new experiences in this
manner, but not new ideas, new concepts, 
advances in human understanding: For 
these, we need the effort of reflection"(p 17).
 
How can artifacts created to serve the function of reducing mental 
effort be designed to encourage that very effort?  This is the 
central dilemma of the book, one that Norman does not resolve except 
by invoking the hardly new, and in this context inadequate, notion of 
human-centered design.
 
Because of information technology, we do have much more information 
at our disposal. We can work at home, on planes, trains and in cars. 
Many of us can communicate rapidly and easily with individuals all 
over much of the world. We do seem to be able to do more of a certain 
kind of work with information technology than without, but do we work 
better? Do we write better books, do we say more profound things, make 
better art? Or do we just churn out more material? None of the great 
thinkers of history had much in the way of 'cognitive artifacts' 
beyond pen and paper. Is the quality of our thinking better than 
theirs?
 
The obvious conclusion is that information technology, however well 
designed, gets in the way of thinking reflectively. It does not make 
us smarter, and is not helping us solve the enormous global problems 
we face. It provides increasingly rich and realistic experiences, and 
this is the main thrust of new developments such as multimedia and 
virtual reality, which is where the action is. Making the reasonable 
assumption that the technological push is irresistible, by this view 
the best we can do is minimize the damage by designing relatively 
harmless 'cognitive artifacts'. It is as dangerous, and false, to 
expect technological solutions to life's problems from 'cognitive 
artifacts' as it was to expect them from AI (as so many did in the 
1980s).
 
There is a strong dose of cognitive dissonance for any computer 
scientist who might be tempted to see the information revolution, and 
their role in it, in this light. I his may be what underlies the 
pervasive optimism in these circles.  When one has a vested interest 
in thinking otherwise, and in the face of relentless promotional 
propaganda, it has become hard to accept that things do not make us 
smarter, they simply make us more powerful (and dangerous).  "User-
centered system design", "Cognitive Ergonomics" and "Human Factors 
Psychology", far from heralding an improvement in the quality of 
thought, represent a last ditch attempt to retain some element of 
reflection in the exercise of this increased power. They are vital 
for that reason alone.
 
So, human-centered design? Yes. Because it will create things that 
make us smart?  No. In fact, we need human-centered design just 
because things won't make us smart. We need human-centered design 
to stop the things we make making us even less smart than we already 
are. A more accurate title for Norman's book would have been 
"Avoiding things that make us more STUPID", but perhaps that would 
not have sold so well.
 
Norman's new book is not as much fun as POET. It is not so 
entertaining, feels conceptually thinner, and is a bit repetitive. 
But it is thought provoking in some ways, and the message about the 
need for human-centered design bears endless repetition. HCI 
specialists will find it easy reading. Did it make me smart? 
Only in the same, irritating way that sitting in a patch of nettles 
would. What irritated me most is that it seems to have been written 
for someone who has been off the planet, or in suspended animation, 
for the past 10 years. Perhaps it should be recommended reading 
for the AI community.
 
Donald A Norman. Things That Make Us Smart (Addison-Wesley, 1993); 
290 pages.